WP: "Chinese Weapons Flooding Africa"

Ugandan Soldier.          Photo credit Peter Doerrie

On Sunday, August 26, 2012 the Washington Post front-page stories included "Chinese Weapons Flooding Africa" with the subheadings "Arms Reach Areas Embargoed by U.N." and "Beijing Works to Thwart Inquiries into Violations."

The article states that Chinese companies are now a major presence at arms shows in Africa, and Chinese arms have been found in multiple war zones, although "there is no proof that China or its arms exporters have intentionally violated U.N. embargoes in any of these countries. But China has stood apart from other major arms exporters, including Russia, for its assertive challenge to U.N. authority, routinely refusing to co-operate with U.N. arms experts and flexing its diplomatic muscle to protect its allies and curtail investigations that may shed light on its own secretive arms industry."

As David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said, "This is really a case of unbridled capitalism and I think the Chinese government is not even always aware of what these companies are doing." Somali pirates have been caught with Chinese made RPGs. Ammunition apparently made in China has been found in Sudan. Chinese diplomats have been "extremely sensitive" about arms investigations in conflict zones. US officials noted that "China was needlessly drawing attention to itself even though other countries such as Russia, Belarus and Ukraine were supplying Sudan with deadlier and more advanced weapons, including attack helicopters."

The data on Chinese small arms exports from the UN Comtrade is very clear. As in other areas, Chinese exports are booming. China's "going global" policy of increasing exports and taking over markets from other exporters is the force pushing this, although they still have a long way to go.Overall, the United States continues to be the world's top exporter of arms. According to the Congressional Research Service, US arms exports tripled in 2011, a total of $66.8 billion. Russia was second, with a paltry $4.8 billion. The US accounted for 78 percent of global arms sales.

For interesting background, see a thesis by Meredith Blank at the University of Michigan that includes case studies of Chinese arms exports to Niger and Iraq. Blank argues that revenues from arms sales do not explain the pattern of sales she identified. However, she compares these revenues to China's total military expenditure. In China's decentralized/privatized world, this is probably not the right way to see them. As we saw in the notorious Libya case, it appears that Chinese companies with their own balance sheets are "going global" and making arms export decisions and deals. While these exports would certainly have to be approved somewhere up the chain of command, the profits can stay with the company. This is incentive enough.

Beijing generally respects the UN. As research by Harvard professor Alastair Ian Johnston shows in his book Social States, Chinese diplomats were socialized into embracing arms control positions after joining regional and global arms control institutions. Its position on the Security Council gives it an extraordinary power for a developing country. Beijing needs to step up and do the right thing on UN investigations into arms transfers in conflict zones. 

For more on the arms transfer issue, see an earlier China Africa Real Story blog post.

African Attitudes Toward Chinese Migrants

Chinese migration expert Yoon Jung Park was interviewed by Radio Australia on her fieldwork surveying attitudes toward Chinese immigrants in southern Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe). She also draws on colleagues' research in Zambia and Botswana. Park finds that while media coverage highlights problems and tensions, the actual attitudes of Africans varies across countries. In South Africa, consumers appreciate the greater range of goods available from Chinese traders. Her research in Zimbabwe also reflected this, and consumers emphasized that during the time of hyperinflation, Chinese shops were able to source affordable goods when others couldn't.

To read more, click here.

Kenyan Traders Protest Against Chinese Competitors

The proliferation of Chinese traders in African markets is one of the perinneal sore spots in China-Africa relations. This video highlights the recent protests in Nairobi where African traders fear and resent the competition. Consumers generally welcome the expansion of products at lower cost, but frequently complain about the low quality of cheap goods.

On the plus side: cheap Chinese cell phone have allowed Africans at the bottom of the pyramid to communicate in unexpectedly large numbers. On the negative side, counterfeit pharmaceuticals -- a regular phenomenon -- can exacerbate illness or fail to prevent death. This creates a climate of fear and distrust affecting all Chinese pharmaceutical exports. None of these products need to be sold by Chinese, of course. As I've noted in this blog, thousands of African traders visit Chinese cities and export directly from China to their home markets.

While some traders believe that their governments are required to accept Chinese immigrants or traders as a quid pro quo for aid, I have never seen any seen any evidence of an agreement to this effect. Some governments do allow Chinese construction companies to import a proportion of Chinese workers for a project. Some works may stay on as traders. Ultimately, decisions about local competition rest with African governments. In Ethiopia, for example, there are no Chinese retailers on the street.

A hat tip to Solange Chatelard.

Chinese Roads in the DRC: Status?

A Danish reader, Jan Jensen, wrote with a question about the status of the Chinese infrastructure package in the DRC. A lot was pledged in the contract originally signed five years ago. This contract was substantially revised in the wake of pressure from the IMF and the West, concerned about the DRC's sovereign guarantees. I don't think the mine has yet begun to produce copper, but I haven't been following this project (and am too swamped with my job and house transitions to look into it now!). Jensen wrote that he had seen a BBC article several years ago about Chinese tarmacking of the 100 km road from the Zambian border to Lumumbashi, but hadn't seen much since then. Has anyone been following this?

China, Africa, FOCAC and Hillary Clinton

I have been offline for much of the past 20 days, first on vacation in the Vancouver area, Olympic Peninsula and the San Juan islands, then at our family "compound" in northern Maine. Heading back to the northern woods today for the rest of the week, after a family wedding in Falmouth. From the FOCAC meetings in Beijing July 19-20 to Hillary Clinton's visit to Africa, there's been a lot happening on the China-Africa front.

I will be posting soon on the Chinese pledge of $20 billion to Africa: what does this mean? I'll also be commenting on Secretary Clinton's comments on "China".

But now, back to the pines, the loons, the cool northern breezes, and a nearly full moon rising over Moosehead Lake.

South South Cooperation at the UN

On Thursday and Friday last week I attended the UN's Development Cooperation Forum, a biennial meeting held by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and focused on foreign aid and development cooperation. This year emphasized development cooperation partners from the South. A very interesting tension is developing at the institutional level. The rules for foreign aid and development cooperation have largely been set by the north (ever since the early demise of plans for the SUNFED in the 1950s). The OECD's Development Assistance Committee is the main locus of this rule-setting. The rise of China, India, and others -- few of whom are OECD members -- has some countries talking about the UNDCF taking on more of a rule-negotiation role. Like the WTO, which sets rules for trade, the UNDCF is a forum with more potential to be global than an organization within the OECD. To see my short introductory comments and other presentations at the UNDCF, click here.  

Learning Chinese in Zambia

A growing number of students are producing really first rate field research on China in Africa. I recently read the M.A. thesis of Arwen Hoogenbosch, who is finishing his M.A. in Leiden. His thesis, "Made-in-China”: Chinese as a commodity and a socioeconomic resource in Chinese language schools in Zambia" makes fascinating reading.

Arwen spent several months doing "participant observation", enrolled in a Chinese language school in Zambia (which has both a Confucius Institute and a private-for-profit Chinese language school). He got to know his fellow students, and reports on their varied goals and hopes for learning Chinese. 

It's vividly written and full of interesting findings. For example, the story of "William":

... For most of his life, William and his siblings grew up on a Chinese operated farm. The Chinese farmer invested in the children and paid their tuition. The farmer also sent William to the Confucius Institute to learn Chinese. The Chinese employer can be seen as the family’s patron, which improved the cultural capital of the children. The Chinese employer also advised William to work at a Chinese restaurant to improve his Chinese. William’s social capital translated into cultural capital, by living with the Chinese farmer.

This kind of relationship is not what one would expect from watching "When China Met Africa" (which features a rather less sensitive farmer) and it reinforces a point we can't make too often: there is not one "China" in "Africa".

Then there is "Raymond":

In his work as a policeman he noticed that Chinese people in Zambia were increasingly coming into contact with law enforcement: “Often when they come to the office they cannot defend themselves because they do not speak English, but they have the right to hear what they have done wrong in a language they understand”. When he proposed to learn Chinese, his boss agreed and told him he could do a course in Chinese language during office hours.

Listening this deeply, and sharing these stories online, makes this a valuable piece of work. Thanks, Arwen.

Arwen's analysis of the motives for Zambians to study Chinese is thoughtful. Some thought it would advance their job prospects, although Arwen writes: "it appears that Chinese companies prefer Chinese skilled employees." I think there is a lot more potential for Africans who speak Chinese than perhaps Arwen does. I'm current in Ethiopia and seeing some fascinating examples of Chinese companies employing Ethiopians at a high management level. One firm's production manager is Ethiopian -- he runs the place (the Chinese owner also has factories in Somalia, Sudan, Mali, and several other African countries). More on that in a later blog post.

China in Africa Blog Wins Danwei Award

Today I was informed that this blog, China in Africa: the Real Story, won a Danwei Model Worker Awards 2012. What's that, you might ask? Apparently it's "a list of the best specialist websites, blogs and online sources of information about China." Danwei is "a website and research firm that tracks Chinese media and Internet."

Thanks, Danwei, and a hat tip to Jan Berris at the National Committee for US China Relations, for letting me know.

Does China Use Aid to Support Investment?

I address this question in the latest issue of East Asia Forum, 4, 2 (April - June 2012). Published by Australia National University in Canberra, the EAF was released at a very interesting (but unfortunately closed) conference at Columbia University/Business School on Monday this week, focused on the political and economic impact of China's overseas direct investment (ODI or OFDI).

For a link to the public forum that evening, including short talks by some participants and a keynote by Jeffrey Sachs, click here. Although Sachs is no expert on Chinese overseas investment, he is a passionate advocate for the earth. It's good to be passionate, and it's pretty rare for academics ...

"When China Met Africa" at Center for Global Development

The Center for Global Development presents a Global Development Matters Movie Night with
When China Met Africa
Wednesday, June 20, 2012 5:00pm–6:30pm **Light refreshments provided** Featuring Nick Francis Co-Writer, -Producer and -Director, "When China Met Africa" Co-Founder, Speak-it With Discussant Deborah Brautigam Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute Professor, School of International Service, American University (on leave 2011-2012) Hosted By Vijaya Ramachandran Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development Click to RSVP LOCATION Center for Global Development Third Floor 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 METRO Dupont Circle (Red line)   Please bring photo identification   CONTACT events@cgdev.org 202-416-4000 CGD is pleased to announce the first screening of its annual summer film series, Global Development Matters. The 2012 series will commence on June 20 with a screening of "When China Met Africa." The film portrays the expanding footprint of a rising global power through the stories of three characters: Zambia’s trade minister, Felix Mutati; a Chinese farm-owner; and a project manager for a Chinese multinational company. The film explores the daily dependency and friction between the characters and points to a radically different future, not just for Africa, but also for the world. Nick Francis and his brother, Marc Francis, are award-winning filmmakers and the co-founders of the London based film company, 'Speak-it.' Their work deconstructs contemporary global issues into relevant and engaging stories for international audiences. Their first feature film "Black Gold", a story about one man’s struggle to save 74,000 coffee farmers from bankruptcy, was released to critical acclaim worldwide changing the way millions of people and companies think about coffee. "When China Met Africa" is their most recent film. Deborah Brautigam is an expert in China-Africa relations and author of the book, The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa.

Chinese Thinking on Taxation and African Infrastructure

On Friday last week while I was in Nairobi at a World Bank event on China and fragile states, The Star (Nairobi) published an insightful article by Chinese engineers Su Wu and Kou Yang. I've noted in The Dragon's Gift how China's policy banks have followed the "request-based" financing model made famous by Japan. This article shows how Chinese companies are trying to educate Africans about ways in which they can afford to have [more Chinese companies] build their infrastructure. I especially like this because it combines my two interests: China/Africa, and Taxation and State-Building.  A hat tip to Paul S. Rogers.

"Kenya: Here Is How to Build Costly Infrastructure," The Star (Nairobi) By Su Wu and Kou Yang*, 25 May, 2012.

Most of African countries are under developed and unable to afford the construction of infrastructures. Therefore, the establishment of a proper taxation system that will enable the collection of adequate capital for infrastructure is naturally a subject quite valuable for studying.
The importance of a good infrastructure in development cannot be over-emphasized. However developing such an infrastructure requires huge sums of money. Building for instance the 1412km road from Lamu Port of Kenya to South Sudan, requires about $ 2.118 billion.

Setting aside such a huge amount of money from the national budget will surely result in a big deficit and unfavourable effect on the economy. So it is wise to apply [for a] loan for the construction with expected profits of the road as mortgage.

China Africa Development Fund Not Attractive Enough in China

China Africa Development Fund, the equity investment arm established by China Development Bank and launched at the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, has failed in its effort to raise $2 billion on the capital markets. Instead, says a story published by China's vigorous economics newspaper Caixin, the state will arrange a second injection of foreign exchange:   "The fund’s parent, China Development Bank (CDB), arranged the US$ 2 billion worth of eight- to 10-year loans at bargain interest rates after CADF’s cash injection plan, some two years in the making, won State Council approval in March."

Chinese private funds and investors were not tempted by the potentially high returns on offer in Africa. And they were put off by the CADF's mission of holding shares for at least five years and potentially longer, to give projects a chance to mature. Caixin's analysis reinforces some of my points about China following the Japan path. Here's Caixin again:

"Nevertheless, economists say CADF’s initiative underscores China’s shift from exporting products to exporting capital – a path Japan followed in the 1980s after coordinating government and commercial agencies to promote overseas development."

One mistake in the article. An anecdote said to be about Libya is actually about Liberia (below). This interesting story illustrates the independence of state-owned companies. They couldn't be compelled to take over a politically important project. But it also shows something unfortunate about CADF: apparently, it could be compelled.

"A private company from China had signed a US$ 2.6 billion contract with the government of Libya [Liberia] for a mining project. But the Chinese side couldn’t fulfill its obligations, so it put the project up for sale. At the time, state-owned steel companies were unwilling to get involved partly due to perceived risks of doing business in Africa. CADF assumed 85 percent of the project and negotiated a settlement with the Libyan [Liberian] government, making the project more appealing to potential Chinese buyers. Later, Wuhan Iron and Steel Group bought a 60 percent stake."

See the original story on China-Wire.org, a great website that aggregates stories on China themes. 

University of Nairobi Public Lecture

I will be speaking at the University of Nairobi Thursday afternoon May 24, 2012, on "China and Africa in the 21st Century," from 3:30 to 5:00 pm. The lecture will be co-hosted by the Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations, the Africa Research and Resources Forum, and the World Bank's Global Center on Conflict, Security, and Development. The lecture will be followed by a debate on China's role in Africa.

Location: University of Nairobi, Education Building, ED 213, 2nd Floor.

Update, Thursday, May 24: great turnout at the lecture, but not enough time for all those waving hands to be called on by the moderator, Professor Michael Chege. Let's see how many students find this blog and ask their questions here, as I invited them to do!

Podcast of Interview at AmCham Beijing

I spoke at the American Chamber of Commerce during my quick trip to Beijing recently. Great fun to see old friends like Dwight Nordstrom, with whom I started Chinese classes in 1979 in the Yale in China program then at Hong Kong's Chinese University. He's now an active industrialist with factories in Beijing and elsewhere. Here's a link to the podcast of an interview that AmCham did with me after the talk.

"Zombie" Chinese Land Grabs in Africa Rise Again in New Database!

Sigh.

How durable is a bad news report? How many lives does a zombie have?

How often are we going to find hugely expensive efforts to collect and "verify" land grab "data" that include verification methodologies where one NGO collection of news media stories serves to validate the cases collected by another NGO?

Last week, the new Land Matrix "land grab" database was released at a big World Bank conference on land. The Land Matrix project is "an international partnership involving five major European research centres and 40 civil society and research groups from around the world." On paper, they have a strong methodology and very strict criteria about projects that are to be included. But in practice, they seem to violate their own rules routinely, at least when it comes to Chinese "projects" in Africa.

A colleague who attended the launch told me that "China" was named as the biggest "land grabber" worldwide. He knows my work on this, so he raised an eyebrow, and so did I when he told me. (Were any other eyebrows raised? I don't know.)

I understand there is a lot of Chinese land investment in Asia, especially in Cambodia and Laos. I don't know the Asia cases, but when the database was made public, I checked the China-Africa cases in the online database, which supposedly only lists the cases that have passed their "robust" fact-checking process (which apparently involves checking to see if another NGO has published a link to a media report on an alleged case).  I was interested to see which "Zombie Chinese projects" (i.e. dead projects, or projects that in fact never had any life to them at all!) are in their database as confirmed. Here is a sample:

(1) ZTE oil palm project 2.8 million hectares in DRC The project was discussed but never finalized, land was never allocated, the project -- which was almost certainly a maximum of 100,000 ha -- was never this large -- and has been dead in the water for years.

(2) ABSA Biofuels 30,200 ha in Ethiopia. Huh? This proposed joint venture is not "Chinese" but South African-Chinese-Ethiopian, and was listed in an Ethiopian database in 2008 as in the "pre-implementation" phase. It has never been implemented.

(3) Malibya 100,000 irrigated rice project in Mali. This is identified as Chinese/Libyan investors. In fact, it is only Libyan. They hired a Chinese contractor to develop the irrigation. It is not a Chinese investment.

(4) Uganda 40,500 ha Heibei [sic] multipurpose project. This project, "Hanhe Uganda Hebei Farm," is a reality, but the figure of 40,500 ha is a wild hope for the future, not an actual concession. Today, the Hebei entrepreneur, Qiu Lijun, is cultivating vegetables and mushrooms on 173 ha, with an initial capital of 9.9 million RMB (a bit more than $1.5 million). A 2010 article on a Hebei website in China provided a figure of 8097 ha (20,000 acres) for the project, but it isn't clear if this is an actual land concession or a plan. In late 2011, he spoke about plans of expanding to 17,333 hectares (260,000 mu) 'in the near future'. *

(5) Zimbabawe 101,170 ha irrigated maize project. I've written about this countless times. It was a construction contract given to a Chinese company by the Zimbabwe government, not a Chinese investment. They were not paid. They went home. The land never ended up being developed. This all happened almost ten years ago, in 2003 for Pete's sake!

So, another pretty awful collection of so-called "data", with strong media attention that will give yet another round of life to these Zombie Stories. For more from me on this topic, search this blog under "Land Grab".

A hat tip to Poul Wisborg (and to Duncan Green at Oxfam for circulating the link).

-------
*My analysis of the Uganda case was revised on June 18, 2012.

Are the Chinese the Worst? A Comparative ILO Study in Zambia

In all the heat over the Human Rights Watch study of a Chinese mining company in Zambia, I may have missed discussions of a 2010 study by the ILO (authored by Chrispin Radoka Matenga) that actually compared companies in Zambia's copper belt: "The Impact of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis on Job Losses and Conditions of Work in the Mining Sector in Zambia." 

This paper has data on employment, accidents, and so on across the mines. According to the study: "Comparing these [accident] figures with the total number of employees for each mine in Table 3 and 4 above, NFCA [the Chinese copper company] has the highest accident rate for all the mines in the country" (p. 12).

A Zambian official said: “Safety records for most companies have drastically gone down, with most companies recording slightly higher levels of accidents. For example, the Chinese have the worst safety record. In some of these mines, you find the boss himself is going underground with flipflops”.

Conditions of work are bad in a number of non-Chinese mines, especially for contract workers:

"For example, Bresmar Investment Limited, a contractor company with Kansanshi Mine in Solwezi, has reduced wages for its workers from K3,600 per hour to K2,900.40 per hour. These workers toil for 12 hours a day for seven (7) continuous days and rest for four (4) days."

I found out about this study via an April 8, 2012 posting by Research for Development at the Rural Modernity blog.

China's Health Aid in Africa: Same Old Problems

When I wrote my first book on Chinese aid to Africa in 1998, I documented how problems with language and local capacity led to difficulties in technology transfer with material goods -- although skill transfers ("learning by doing") were more successful.

Today Chinese journalist Beibei Yin sent me his newly published article in the Financial Times -- "Chinese donations: Tale of frustration that lies behind health aid to Africa."

Yin shows how little has changed. Chinese medical teams appear to be popular, but Chinese equipment and medicine donations are still coming with instructions only in Chinese. Training is inadequate (five days!), and, consequently, donated goods and machinery sit gathering dust until they expire -- a huge waste for China and for the recipient. This probably doesn't happen at the few places where Chinese doctors practice in revolving medical teams -- but the malaria centers built by the Chinese in an number of African countries do not have any Chinese staff or assistants.

Changing this would require a number of things to change:

• Chinese exports -- even if donations -- need to come with instruction manuals in English, French, Swalihi and other languages used by educated people in recipient countries. The Ministry of Commerce has been pushing Chinese companies to do this for years, why can't they get the aid donations to follow suit?

• The Chinese government could finance a Chinese expert (or a small team) who speaks the local language and could operate the machinery together with local technicians, for a year or so. This would allow learning by doing, while working out the kinks while a machine was still under some kind of warrantee.

Yin was not able to study a number of the malaria centers, but this is also an area ripe for student (and other) research. I saw how Ethiopia appears to have good plans for its agro-technical demonstration center, while Tanzania was not at all clear how they would use their "Chinese gift." How have the malaria centers fared across the various countries that have received them? What explains the outcomes.

Africa's Free Press Problem: Is China Causing It?

Source: Henry Hall's China Africa News

On April 15, 2012, the New York Times published an op-ed by Mohamed Keita on Africa's free press problem, arguing that press freedom was getting worse in Africa -- because of China.

Keita's piece makes a lot of good points. Investigative reporters have a very tough road in many parts of Africa and there are many examples of courage under impossibly tough conditions.

However, his opinion oversteps his evidence in linking increased Chinese economic activity in Africa with increased repression of the media.

Asking "Why this disturbing trend? (of media repression)" Keita points to (inter alia) "the influence of China, which surpassed the West as Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009."

As an example of this causal linkage, Keita wrote: "The volume of trade between Rwanda and China increased fivefold between 2005 and 2009. During the same period, the government has eviscerated virtually all critical press and opposition and has begun filtering Rwandan dissident news Web sites based abroad."

I had to bite my fingers to stop them from typing something snarky after this statistical analysis.
 
Keita actually does make a good point in his observation that with growing trade, "China has been deepening technical and media ties with African governments to counter the kind of critical press coverage that both parties demonize as neocolonialist."

Rather than training African reporters to be like Xinhua reporters, the Chinese goal in stepping up training and PR activities is to present a different picture of Chinese activities in Africa to counter the negative reporting eminating from "the West". Here's where Keita gets it right:  

"More than 200 African government press officers received Chinese training between 2004 and 2011 in order to produce what the Communist Party propaganda chief, Li Changchun, called “truthful” coverage of development fueled by China’s activities." (emphasis added).

It is easy to understand why both the Chinese and African governments might want a more balanced picture of their activities. Cambridge (UK) academic Emma Mawdsley has written the classic piece on negative media coverage of China in Africa, juxtaposed with positive reporting on the west's engagement: "Fu Manchu Versus Dr. Livingston on the Dark Continent? Representing China, Africa, and the West in British Broadsheet newspapers" Political Geography 27 (2008).

And the fun continues. See the new report on "China's Global Media Image," launched by Renmin University and Sweden's 21st Century Frontiers (and spearheaded by Dennis Pamlin) which analyzed 100 major media magazine covers featuring China -- more than 60 percent clearly pictured China as a threat, and not open to dialogue.

While Keita rightly emphasizes many African governments' reluctance to hear criticism, it is also clear that Africa has long been presented to outside audiences as the dark continent of chaos, child soldiers, famine, etc.

It's not just 54 African governments that are tired of outsiders determining their global image. France is also tired of Anglo domination of the TV media, hence they've launched their own English media service: France 24. A perception of Western bias in coverage of the Middle East, Islam, etc., in part underpinned the launch of Al-Jazeera.

As a Chinese reporter put it, "Although they are geographically far apart, China and Africa have long learned about each other through Western media." Farooq Sulehria, a Pakistani writer added, "We largely view the world through the media. It is our window on the world. If we see the world through the eyes of the West, we will be siding with Tarzan instead of blacks without asking: what is Tarzan, a white man, doing in African jungles?"

IMO, this"media balancing" is far more important for the Chinese than any effort to get African reporters to modify or soften their reporting on African governments, as impled by Keita. In fact, with their reluctance to intervene in internal affairs of other countries, I would be surprised if the Chinese do training focused on anything to do with African journalists vis a vis their coverage of African governments). But who knows? He wasn't reporting. He was giving an opinion.

Instead of these general op-eds that are only, after all, opinions, wouldn't it be better to have some actual investigative reporting on this issue? What about doing an indepth study of the Chinese media training programs, or interviewing a random sample of the press officers and African journalists that have attended them?

For those who are interested, I have written about this topic earlier, in a piece "Comments on Winds from the East," a National Endowment for Democracy study. My comments were published at Pambazuka in January 2011.

The lonely world of Chinese Traders in Africa

Researcher (me) interviewing Chinese trader

The Brenthurst Foundation in South Africa has just published a sensitive, detailed and eye-opening study by Terence McNamee (with others) of more than 200 Chinese traders in several South African countries: "Africa in Their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola." It's also beautifully written!

The study's main points match my own research and experience, particularly the bitter belief by nearly all small traders and "China shop" owners that the Chinese government does nothing for them. As a trader in the Kariakoo market in Dar Es Salaam told me: "The Chinese government helps the Tanzanians. It doesn't help me." Highly recommended.

I'm sorry the researchers apparently never saw the very good paper by my former student Rachel Laribee, who did similar research in South Africa with Chinese shop keepers, "The China Shop Phenomenon: Trade Supply within the Chinese Diaspora in South Africa." Rachel pointed out how competitive the different China shops were with each other, not just with African shops. There was no "China, Inc." in her study, either.

Another hat tip to Yoon Park.

Whatever Happened to the Chinese special economic zone in Algeria?

Jiangling Motors SUV ... but probably not in Algeria

En route home from speaking in Chapel Hill, I learned a bit more about one of the failed Chinese efforts to establish an overseas economic zone (in Algeria) in a new paper written by Chris Alden and Faten Aggad-Clerx for the African Development Bank.

(p. 10) "... in 2008 China and Algeria entered into an agreement to establish a second Chinese Special Economic Zone in North Africa, the Jiangling Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, which was to be hosted in Mostaganem (western Algeria) with the focus on assembling cars. The agreement involved the Chinese Jiangling Motors Cooperation and Jiangxi Coal Corporation Group and their Algerian partner, Groupe Mazouz. The activities of the Jiangling Zone were expected to assemble 50000 units in the five years that would follow. The deal was welcomed as Algeria seeks to revive its automobile sector, which collapsed in the 1990s."

Tang Xiaoyang and I found that the Algerian zone was cancelled after Algeria changed its laws on foreign investment to require Algerian ownership of at least 51% of a project. But this paper adds some new details and theories:

(p. 10) "Others have argued that the decision was influenced by ongoing negotiations between the Algerian government and the French car manufacturer, Renault, for the establishment of the Renault car-assembling factory in Algeria. Renault was said to be concerned that it would face  stiff competition from Chinese car manufacturers if they were to also produce in Algeria. (Renault eventually withdrew its offer and opened a factory in neighbouring Morocco). Subsequent interviews with Groupe Mazouz also indicated a concern over the quality of Chinese products given the high demands of the Algerian consumer and their attraction to anything produced by the West. Furthermore, as noted above, the Chinese companies and their Algerian partners have been involved in fraud cases further damaging the reputation of Chinese companies."

Another case perhaps of reputational risks sliding across sectors and companies.

It's good to see Chris Alden return to the China-Africa research field. A hat tip to Hayley Hermann via Yoon Park.

Chinese in the South Pacific: Echos of Africa

PNG dormitory under construction (G. Smith photo credit)

Today a former student sent me links to two interesting papers by an Australian Ph.D. student with Chinese language who is doing research on Chinese engagement in the South Pacific. Graeme Smith's take on the Chinese runs up against hardline Australian opinion, media coverage, and the conventional wisdom that seems to be -- if it can be possible -- even more negative than coverage in Europe and the U.S. regarding Africa. (For an example, see a series of articles by China correspondent Rowan Callick, including "China’s neo-colonial slavery in PNG", The Australian, 12 February 2007, and so on.)

In a short piece called "Are Chinese loans always a bad thing?" (the very title shows what a balanced analyst is up against in Australia!) Smith gives the inside story of a concessional loan arranged via a Chinese construction company to build a dormitory at a South Pacific university, and how university students protected the Chinese workers during the riots, because it was their dormitory being built. Smith's paper also notes the "request-based" aid system for concessional loans that I discuss in The Dragon's Gift, showing in detail how it worked in this case:

Whether it is a grant or a loan affects local control and ownership. With a grant, local partners have little leverage. As a University administrator explained, '(t)he difference is that this is a loan. Even if it is a soft loan, we're still going to pay them back. So it's really the government of PNG paying for it. We're in total control of it.'

My thesis that Chinese infrastructure companies in the Pacific, not aid agencies in Beijing, are driving aid requires more substantiation. Yet for those with even a passing familiarity with China's polity, it is a no-brainer. The Chinese central government lacks full agency and control within its own borders; why would it enjoy it outside of them?

This lack of control can lead to better outcomes for Pacific nations. In the case of the dormitory project, the tail wagged the dog. GDFC [a Chinese construction firm] successfully lobbied Exim Bank in Shanghai. The contractor, rather than the lending agency, penned the initial loan agreement. Remarkably, the university and the lead architect in PNG were able to push back, persuading Exim Bank to accept their terms for the design and supervision of the project, because they were competitive on price, and arrived at the negotiating table with plans and standards to hand.

In a March 2012 article in the Journal of Pacific History (available free for two weeks only) mainly on Chinese reactions to the anti-Asian riots in the South Pacific, Smith argues:

When China does appear in the literature, analysis is rarely nuanced or informed by original sources. This is evidenced by the titles of many articles, where China appears as an anthropomorphised ‘clumsy panda’ or as the ‘dragon in the Pacific’, lurking in the background, secretively disbursing aid, corrupting weak and passive Pacific governments, and engaging in an endless cloak-and-dagger game for diplomatic recognition with its arch nemesis, Taiwan.

One by one, Smith punctures a host of myths and fictions that dominate some of the coverage of Chinese activities in the region. He then analyzes Chinese reactions (via interviews and the blogosphere) to the Port Moresby riots. It's useful and interesting, and China-Africa watchers will benefit from the comparative perspective.

A hat tip to Ekawati Liu.

Links I Liked: Land Grabs, Etc.

(1) A "Land Grabs in Africa" Study that Doesn't Target China.  Opening a recent paper on land grabs published by Earth Security, I expected to find the usual sentences about "China" leading the land grab in Africa. I was pleasantly surprised to find nothing of the sort. Instead, a balanced assessment of the risks and of the sources of risk:

"Key investors are private firms and governments from Europe, Africa, the Gulf States, and South and East Asia, and a growing base of institutional investors, sovereign wealth funds, and private wealth owners, generally in deals made with host governments."

One area missing: as the "database" on over 400 "land grabs" (or media stories) published by the NGO GRAIN on February 23, 2012, pointed out, a large number of American investors are also part of the picture.

China, the US, and Export Credits

I've just learned of a little-remarked result of Xi Jiping's February 2012 meeting with President Obama in Washington DC. As reported by Reuters, the US and China have agreed to open talks on setting rules and guidelines for officially supported export credits.

This small announcement is big news for China-Africa watchers. Right now, these rules and guidelines are mainly set by the OECD's working group on officially supported export credits ("aid for trade"). China, of course, is not a member, and thus is not bound by the OECD norms and rules. Any acceptable conclusion on these guidelines will have to involve more transparency by the Chinese. Transparent reporting is the heart of the Arrangement, the "gentlemen's agreement" that regulates export credit practices among OECD members. Of course the OECD does not require members to publish their individual export credit agreements to the world, just share them confidentially with the working group. But even getting annual figures broken down across regions or countries, would be a huge advance.

A hat tip to Richard Carey.

Inside Trade adds a bit more to this:

The agreement announced last week by the United States and China to pursue a common set of international guidelines on official export financing by 2014 is aimed at creating a new framework that would ultimately replace the export credit arrangement that currently exists between members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), according to a Treasury Department official.

A hat tip to Michal Makocki.

Related to the export credit talks is the release a few weeks ago of a General Accounting Office (GAO) comparative study of export financing practices, mainly focused on the G-7 (remember them?): "U.S Export Bank: Actions Needed to Promote Competitiveness and International Cooperation."

As part of this, the GAO revealed that the US Eximbank (Ex-Im):

• "financed 132 transactions totaling $812 million in 20 sub-Saharan African countries. Ex-Im dedicates two full-time employees to promoting exports to sub-Saharan Africa; others work part-time on the issue" (p. 21). 
• Between 2000 and 2010, China Eximbank's total export credit support grew from $4 billion to over $36 billion, while US Ex-Im's "financing increased from about $13 billion to $24.5 billion (p. 39)."  

We can assume that China Eximbank has more than two full time people working on boosting business in Africa!

"China Refused to Fund Agricultural Project in Sudan for Lack of Oil Collateral"

S

Sudanese farmers (c) Shelter for Life International

I've been writing academic papers about Chinese engagement (or lack thereof) in agriculture in Africa recently. Today I opened a link to a Sudan Tribune article with the (misleading) headline: "China Refused to Fund Agricultural Project in Sudan for Lack of Oil Collateral." The article is actually about a Qatar agricultural project -- on 250,000 acres -- that depends on a separate Chinese project to extend Sudan's electrical grid.

As the Sudanese leader -- who is avoiding arrest by the International Criminal Court in the Hague -- said, the Qatari agricultural project

...stalled due to China not following through on its funding for the project of extending the electric grid because the Chinese loan was in return for oil shipments which stopped after the secession of the South” the Sudanese leader said. “And so China stopped the financing [the project]” he added.

This is interesting because it is another example of how China Eximbank (almost certainly the lender) works in risky countries with poor or nonexistent credit ratings. The loan for the electricity project was secured with oil exports. When oil exports stopped, the loan disbursement stopped.

I'll also make a bet: somewhere, a journalist is going to read this as "China's" 250,000 acre agricultural project, not Qatar's!

h/t to the Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch

China-Africa Talk at Columbia University Thursday March 8

Thursday, March 8, 2012, 6:00 PM to 7:30 PM

Asia Pacific Affairs Council, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, and Institute of African Studies present:  "China and Africa: Think Again"

A talk by Deborah Bräutigam, Professor of International Development, School of International Service, American University and Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

International Affairs Building, Room 918, Columbia University, New York
No registration required.

China and Resource-Based Development in Africa

Photo credit:  Duncan Green @ Oxfamblogs.org

Resource exports are widely expected to be a curse rather than a boon for African countries. Is this always the case? How and when do government interventions make a difference? What do we really know about the impact Asian countries (China and India) have had on the commodity value chains and industrial potential of African raw materials?

PRISM -- Policy Research in International Services and Manufacturing (PRISM) is "a research and policy ‘unit' located in the University of Cape Town's School of Economics and is affiliated to the Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR). PRISM provides a lens to focus research and policy work on issues of globalization and industrialization in Sub Saharan Africa." They are looking precisely at the questions outlined above.

“One Thing Leads to Another” – Commodities, Linkages and Industrial Development," by Mike Morris, Raphael Kaplinsky, and David Kaplan sets out the potential and problems for commodity-based industrialization strategies in Africa.

Their team is doing very interesting fieldwork across Africa, including the oil and gas industry in Angola, gold in Tanzania, timber in Gabon. In an email last November, Mike Morris mentioned to me an AERC study on Sudan "which showed that the 13 Chinese oil producers had dragged 97 supplier firms (services and manufacturing) employing around 4500 people, into Sudan." [Source: Suliman, K. M. and A. A. A. Badawi (2010). An Assessment of The Impact of China's Investments in Sudan. CCS Paper No. 13 Nairobi, African Economic Research Consortium.]

 To read more and see a list of the PRISM Discussion Papers:

China International Fund and Tanzania's Airport

Beibei Yin reports in The Guardian March 2, 2012, about further complications from the failed Dar es Salaam Terminal 3 airport project won by China International Fund (CIF) in Tanzania: Chinese Investment in Tanzania Bears Bitter Fruit. Yin's report digs more deeply into the story, and reveals the problems left behind when the Tanzanian government evacuated all the people living in the spot now vacant and fenced. As noted on this blog, I was there in September 2011, and used the vacant lot as the lead for a story about CIF. Yin reports that the CIF logo has now been painted over...

When China Met Africa

Some time ago I had the pleasure of previewing a stunningly good film: When China Met Africa, directed by Nick Francis and Mark Francis (assisted by China-Africa expert and Paris-based Ph.D. student Solange Chatelard). The filmmakers are now organizing a US tour (to learn more, click here). View the trailer here.

The distributor, Bullfrog Films, describes the movie:

"A historic gathering of over 50 African heads of state in Beijing reverberates in Zambia where the lives of three characters unfold. Mr. Liu is one of thousands of Chinese entrepreneurs who have settled across the continent in search of new opportunities. He has just bought his fourth farm and business is booming.

 In northern Zambia, Mr. Li, a project manager for a multinational Chinese company, is upgrading Zambia's longest road. Pressure to complete the road on time intensifies when funds from the Zambian government start running out.

Meanwhile Zambia's Trade Minister is en route to China to secure millions of dollars of investment.

 Through the intimate portrayal of these characters, the expanding footprint of a rising global power is laid bare - pointing to a radically different future, not just for Africa, but also for the world." 

I endorsed the film for Bullfrog Films:

Remarkable. A compelling, unsentimental and very honest portrait of an encounter between two continents pulled together by profits and politics. The filmmakers had extraordinary access to their three central characters, and the trust they obviously built is never betrayed...Viewers will have no difficulty following these multi-layered dramas--at once ordinary and powerful...The format lends itself exceptionally well to discussions: viewers will find they each saw something different. Intimate, moving and very real.

My former colleague Andy Nathan also endorsed the film: 

"A gritty, vivid picture of the new Chinese presence in Africa, from the pompous officials negotiating deals, to the dedicated engineers trying to build roads, to the hardscrabble immigrant Chinese farmer struggling to tame the land and motivate and pay his local workers. It is a new relationship, full of both hope and suspicion, common interest and cultural friction. Driven by economic need, the two sides struggle to bridge the huge gaps between them."

- Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, Author, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress

For another story about this film by someone who was also blown away by it, see the article by Damien Ma in The Atlantic 

China, CNPC, and Chad: social and environmental responsibility

Chad Pipeline (credit Al-Jazeera)

A new China-Africa book from the French Agency for International Development (AFD). In French, (an English version is foreseen soon) this book provides a summary of research done in Chad and China (2010-2011) as a trilateral partnership: with UIBE (China), GRAMP-TC (Chad) and CIRAD, with financing from the French Agency for Development (AFD).  I haven't read it yet, but it looks fascinating. Fieldwork on concrete China-Africa case studies, done by researchers with the appropriate linguistic skills, background, and contacts, is sorely needed and most welcome.
 
Book Summary (courtesy of Romain Dittgen)

This book analyses the factors that influence environmental management in the CNPC when operating outside of China, in the outer margins of the world oil system, specifically in Chad, a Least Developed Country. Within a sector marked by the regulations inherited from the Exxon project in Doba (implemented since 2000 with initial World Bank support), the 2007 CNPC Rônier project aims at refining part of the extracted oil and exporting the remainder, most probably through the pipeline built under the Exxon Doba project. The question of the compatibility between the systems of reference and practices in both firms thus arises.Through the prism of social and environmental responsibility, this text analyses the challenges in the interaction between Chinese oil firms, host countries and OECD-based firms.
 
Click here to download (pdf version)

Four-Way Cooperation: China, France, Uganda, UK

One of the questions I get asked most often by US government officials is:  How can we (the US) do something cooperatively with China in Africa? The idea in Washington is that a successful cooperative development activity will help to build trust, something sorely lacking these days. My response has always been that whatever you do, it needs to be focused on mutual benefit. The oil industry is an obvious place where vast scope exists for some kind of cooperation based on benefits to all three parties (social, environmental, developmental -- moving up the value chain). So far, it doesn't seem to have happened.

That's why Uganda is interesting. It's not the US, but rather China-Uganda-UK-France. China Daily reported February 21, 2012, that CNOOC (a Chinese oil company), France's Total SA, the UK company Tullow Oil, and Uganda are discussing a joint investment in a refinery to process Uganda's newly discovered oil (the country currently imports all of its petroleum products. No doubt if the project goes forward, a Chinese company will build the refinery. It's developmental, cooperative, "win-win." Can't the US foster something similar, somewhere?

H/T to Chinascope

Links I Liked: Chinese Loans in Latin America

I've been participating in a group on China-Latin American organized by the Latin America Dialogue here in Washington, DC. A new report, "The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America," presented to our group by Kevin Gallagher and colleagues on Thursday last week shows us how much higher Chinese financial commitments are in Latin America than they appear to be in Africa: "upwards of some $75 billion" since 2005.

Links I Liked: Brazil & Zimbabwe

Are the other emerging powers following the Chinese embrace of Africa? The Zimbabwe Herald (which is seen in Zim as the govt's mouthpiece) reported in late October, 2011, that Brazil had provided a $300 million loan to Zimbabwe for agricultural support.

If true, it shows how great emerging powers think alike. In March 2011, China Development Bank extended a $342 million loan to Zimbabwe to finance agricultural machinery imports (from China). Interesting that Brazil, a robust democracy, seems to be following Chinese footsteps in doing state-directed business with a government still seen in the US and Europe as one of Africa's foremost pariahs.

A h/t to Peking University's Center for African Studies.

Links I Liked: China's Training Programs

A dry list to some, a treasure trove of information on one aspect of the notoriously "untransparent" Chinese aid program to others.

Here is a link to a list of 129 training programs for officials and nominees from Asian countries, sponsored by China's foreign aid program, and held in China, in 2011. (This particular list was circulated in Pakistan.) Most seminars are about a month. The list has the implementing organization and the seminar topics include, inter alia:

• Economic management
• Learning "commercial" Chinese (this one is three months) 
• Management of community-based Red Cross and Red Crescent projects
• Female capacity building
• Coastal region economic development
• Eco-agriculture
• Railway construction, planning, and engineering
• Pediatric critical care
• Financial openness and financial risk control
• Grain storage technology

and so on ...

Links I Liked: William Wallis on China, Europe, Africa

William Wallis, the Financial Time's Africa correspondent, reflects -- in "China Builds on Europe's Africa Ruins" -- on the new AU Headquarters. Wallis ponders the contrast between the Chinese approach and that of Europe, noting French president Nicholas Sarkozy's October 2007 speech in Dakar (which barely made a ripple):

“The tragedy of Africa is that the African has never really entered history,” Mr Sarkozy said to open mouths in the audience and a barrage of outrage on web sites throughout French-speaking Africa. “The African peasant only knew the eternal renewal of time marked by the endless repetition of the same gestures and the same words. In this realm of fancy there is neither room for human endeavour nor the idea of progress.”

Buried though they were in broader remarks, the French president’s comments were reminiscent of the Hegelian underpinnings of colonial thinking and the notion that African history only began when Europeans brought “progress”. It was an extreme example of the kind of outmoded thinking which still influences debate about Africa in the west.

Wallis also notes (as I pointed out in The Dragon's Gift), China has been building Ministry of Foreign Affairs buildings (and some Ministry of Defense buildings) as diplomatic gifts for African governments in many countries. My thought was that this helps boost good will and soft power in a key ministry. Wallis wondered "has Beijing hardwired African diplomacy to its own advantage?" An interesting question. Perhaps these ministry buildings would benefit from a thorough "bug cleaning"?

A hat tip to Henry Hall at China Africa News.

Guest Post: Human Rights Watch Responds to Critique of China in Zambia Study

Zambian miners

Below is Human Rights Watch's response to Sautman and Yan's critique, summarized yesterday in China Africa: The Real Story.

My blog post and comments on the debate continue below the Scribd text. (If you can't read the insert, please let me know! This is a novel technology for me, as the coding in these guest posts for some reason made them impossible to simply insert.)


Human Rights Watch Responds

From my point of view, an anonymous comment on my original blog post sums up some of the valid criticism: "This report is a case of truth in facts, not truth in reporting..."

I agree that the report provides pretty convincing evidence of human rights problems, and some improvements, in one Chinese company in Zambia -- unlike Sautman and Yan, I don't have the knowledge or the stamina to examine all of the details of the research. And it's likely that other Chinese companies share some of these problems across Africa. But I am bothered that the draft of the study that I reviewed did not contain a comment that later jumped out at me when I read the published summary. Here it is, in bold:

Over the past decade, China has rapidly increased its investment throughout Africa. But while many commentaries have examined the ambivalent relationship between China and Africa, few have systematically examined what Chinese investment means in human rights terms, particularly for Africans employed by China’s state-owned companies. By investigating the specific practices of particular Chinese employers, the conditions of a given set of workers, and the enforcement of labor laws by a particular African government, it is possible to begin to paint a picture of China’s broader role in Africa (emphasis added).

Why does this bother me? Two reasons:

First, the particular Chinese company in Zambia chosen for the study has had a history of very highly publicized labor conflicts, and one terrible disaster where over 50 Zambians died in an explosion. Imagine if the Nature Conservancy had written: "by investigating British Petroleum (BP)'s Deepwater project in the Gulf of Mexico [remember? the big spill?], it is possible to begin to paint a picture of Britain's broader role in North America." I think most people would say: huh?

Second, I was also surprised by the choice of words, that HRW felt that their study was "the beginning" of painting a picture of China's broader role in Africa. Many serious reseachers have already done detailed studies of a number of aspects of China's role in Africa. These studies are, together, aggregating up into a more detailed picture. The HRW study surely fits into this picture, but it is not the start. And the picture of China in Africa is far more complicated than labor relations in one -- or even all -- Chinese-owned mines.

Guest Post "One Barking Dog Sets the Whole Street a-Barking"

Miner in Zambia             photo credit: Reuters

In early November 2011, a brief spate of headlines followed the publication of Human Rights Watch's report on labor practices in a major Chinese company in Zambia: "You'll Be Fired If You Refuse: Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-owned Copper Mines." HRW thanks me for reading and commenting on a pre-publication draft of the report. I also met with HRW's main researcher Matt Wells, a young lawyer, and several others at HRW as the idea for a report coalesced into actual research.

It was clear to me that Matt Wells was trying to do a careful, balanced report, that Chinese labor practices in African mines are roundly felt to be in need of improvement. While I offered some suggestions for improvements, overall I thought the research was sound, and that Matt and HRW had done due diligence in his reporting on the realities of working for one Chinese mining company.

For most people who heard about it, the HRW report was a headline, and little more. But for a small group of people who follow China-Africa relations very closely, the debate over the report has continued, amongst ourselves, and in the pages of the South African magazine Pambazuka. [click here for the lengthy Pambazuka critique of the HRW report by two Hong Kong academics, Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, and here for HRW's response, and here for Sautman and Yan's rejoinder.]

I invited HRW and Sautman/Yan to do shorter guest posts here at China Africa: the Real Story. Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong's critique follows, and HRW's response will be in a separate post (technology limitations).

Guestpost:  One Barking Dog Sets the Whole Street a-Barking

Yan Hairong and Barry Sautman

The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report that singles out Chinese state-owned enterprise(SOE) China Non-ferrous Metals Mining Co. (CNMC) as 'the worst´ foreign-investor in Zambia's copper mining industry exemplifies a Chinese proverb:  'one barking dog sets the whole street barking.´ As soon as HRW leveled its accusation,thousands of media sources rephrased it as proof that 'the Chinese´ were the super-exploitersof Africa. That was entirely predictable, as the HRW report had cued such pronouncements by stating that it is 'a useful magnifying lens into Chinese labor practices in Africa´ that³begin[s] to paint a picture of China's broader role in Africa.´ HRW thereby called to mindlongstanding stereotypes of Chinese cruelty and bolstered the anti-Chinese atmosphere beingfostered by Western politicians and media in response to China's rise (See, e.g. 'On Recent Beijing Visit, a Tall Order for Zambia VP,´ Voice of America, Jan. 10, 2012).